Internet reports that Slow Fog released an analysis of the $230 million theft of Cetus, which pointed out that the core of this incident was that the attacker carefully constructed parameters to allow the overflow to occur but could bypass detection. In the end, the core reason for exchanging huge amounts of liquid assets is that checked_shlw in the get_delta_a function has an overflow detection bypass vulnerability. Attackers took advantage of this, causing the system to deviate significantly when calculating how much haSUI actually needed to add. Because the overflow was not detected, the system misjudged the number of haSUI required, resulting in the attacker being able to exchange a large amount of liquid assets with only a small amount of Tokens, thus achieving the attack. This attack demonstrates the power of mathematical spillover vulnerabilities. Attackers select specific parameters through precise calculations and exploit the flaws in the checked_shlw function to obtain billions of dollars worth of liquidity at the cost of 1 token. This is an extremely sophisticated mathematical attack that recommends that developers strictly verify the boundary conditions of all mathematical functions in smart contract development.